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OVERSEAS TRADE AND THE SHERMAN ACT
DR. ANDRE SIMMONS*
I. The Bases for Sherman Act Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Trade
In an antitrust case involving only domestic trade, the
question of jurisdiction seldom appears today. Numerous ju-
dicial decisions in the last century have settled the question
of intrastate versus interstate trade, and today the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal courts over interstate trade is well es-
tablished. The defendants who violated the antitrust laws
could be reached by those statutes regardless of their citizen-
ship or their domicile, as long as they committed acts within
the United States. Even though the acts in question were only
partially performed within the United States, the statutes
would remain applicable.
Violations of the Sherman Act in respect to foreign trade,
in contrast to domestic trade, have on numerous occasions
presented several important jurisdictional problems. Many
violations of the Sherman Act took place abroad. On many
occasions, agreements to perform certain acts in the United
States were concluded abroad. In many cases foreign com-
panies were involved. In almost all such instances, the ac-
tivities of the defendants were subject to two jurisdictions:
American and foreign. It is not surprising, therefore, that
a clash of conflicting judicial attitudes could very easily
result. Federal courts had to find the right path between two
possibly conflicting objectives. On the one hand, they had
to follow the rules of the comity and of international law.
On the other hand, they had to protect the national interest
and to follow the intent of the Sherman Act. Many difficul-
ties have been created by the fact that there is today no
unanimous agreement on all aspects of international law, and
there is no clear-cut dividing line between the rules of comity
and the rules of international law. According to some experts
many rules of comity are being gradually transformed into
rules of international law.' In addition, international law
*Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Nevada, Reno,
Nevada.
1. L. OPPENHEIiM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 32-33 (7th ed. 1953).
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differs from municipal law in many essential aspects. Ac-
cording to Ross, international law is really more a conven-
tional, noncompulsory order with the character of law, rather
than actual law.2 It is obvious, therefore, that serious judi-
cial problems were involved in the adjudication foreign trade
cases.
In cases where the Sherman Act was applied to foreign
trade activities, the defendants invariably claimed that the
case was outside the jurisdiction of the court, and the courts
before proceeding to the examination of the economic issues
of the case had to settle the question of jurisdiction. This
question had several aspects; first, it involved jurisdiction
in personam over the defendants; second, it involved the
jurisdiction of the Sherman Act over the acts complained of;
third, it dealt with the judisdiction over the relief; and
finally, the question of jurisdiction had to be discussed, in
several cases, with reference to the production of evidence.
In order to evaluate correctly the difficulties involved, this
author intends to present a general discussion of various
theories of jurisdiction. This will be followed by a discus-
sion of jurisdiction with reference to relief and the collection
of evidence. Finally, arguments will be presented for and
against the adoption of the objective theory of jurisdiction
in cases involving violations of the Sherman Act.
A.
The most generally accepted principle of jurisdiction in
international law is the principle of territoriality. This prin-
ciple of territorial competence of jurisdiction "has not been
invented by international law but is merely a legal confirma-
tion of the historical fact, grounded in nature, that the in-
struments of power of the various states have developed
and asserted themselves on a territorial basis. ' 3 In other
words, this principle is based on the fact that "the jurisdic-
tion of a nation within its own territory is necessarily ex-
clusive and absolute,"' 4 and that "the municipal laws of one
nation do not extend, in their operation, beyond its own terri-
tory, except as regard its own citizens and subjects."5
According to Hyde,
2. A. Ross, A TEXTBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 50 (1947).
3. Ross, op. cit., supra, p. 155.
4. J. MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 175 (1906).
5. Id. 1 197.
[Vol. is
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the right to pass upon the lawfulness of an act must
necessarily be the exclusive possession of a single sover-
eign. The right must also, therefore, in every case, be-
long to that sovereign or political power which exer-
cises control over the place where the particular act
is committed .... Conversely, a State cannot determine
the lawfulness of occurrences in places outside of
its control.6
The theory of territorial jurisdiction has a long tradition
in American legal history, and is based on numerous pro-
nouncements of famous American jurists of the nineteenth
century. The most illustrious among those jurists were un-
doubtedly Justices Marshall and Story. Marshall, Chief Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court, said in 1807: "It is conceded that
the legislation of every authority is territorial; that beyond
its own territory, it can affect only its own citizens."7
Justice Story said in 1824: "The laws of no nation can
justly extend beyond its own territories. The sovereign is
expected to refrain from exercising power outside his terri-
tory."8 Some twenty-six years later, Justice Story repeated
his philosophy in the following words:
Another maxim is, that no state or nation can, by its
own laws directly bind property out of its own territory,
or bind persons not resident therein . . . for it would
be wholly incompatible with the equality and exclusive-
ness of the sovereignty of all nations, that any nation
should be at liberty to regulate either persons or things
not within its own territory.9
The principle of strict territoriality found clear expression
in the Banana case, which was the first case in which the
Sherman Act was applied to foreign trade. Basing his opin-
ion on the philosophies of Marshall and Story, Justice Holmes
said that "the general and almost universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done."' 01
He summarized his philosophy by saying that "all legislation
is prima facie territorial.""
6. HYDE, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1 218 (1945).
7. Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch (8 U. S.) 241 at 279 (1807).
8. The Apollon, 9 Wheat. (22 U. S.) 362 at 370 (1824).
9. See A. WIESNER, A Half Century of Jurisdictional Development:
From Bananas to Watches, 7 MIAmI L. Q., 401 (1953).
10. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347 at 356
(1909).
11. Id., at 357.
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The concept of territorial jurisdiction has been extended
on several occasions to acts committed outside the territory
of the lawmaker but producing effects within. This principle,
called the objective theory of jurisdiction, is perfectly com-
patible with the territorial theory of jurisdiction, and has
been accepted by leading legal experts and by American
courts.12 In the famous Lotus case, the International Court
stated that "the territoriality of criminal law . . . is not an
absolute principle of international law and by no means co-
incides with territorial sovereignty."' 3 Basing its opinion on
the objective principle, the Court concluded that as the effects
of the acts complained of took place on a Turkish vessel (i.e.,
Turkish territory), Turkey acquired jurisdiction over the per-
sons responsible for those acts, even if those persons were
not Turkish citizens. Judge Moore, who dissented on other
grounds, accepted this principle also.
The principle of objective jurisdiction was probably best
expressed by Hyde when he stated that
the setting in motion outside of a State of a force which
produces as a direct consequence an injurious effect
therein, justifies the territorial sovereign in prosecuting
the actor when he enters its domain.'4
A similar opinion was expressed by Moore when he con-
cluded that
the principle that a man who outside of a country will-
fully puts in motion a force to take effect in it is an-
swerable at the place where the evil is done, is recog-
nized in the criminal jurisprudence of all countries.' 5
The objective concept of jurisdiction has been approved by
the Restatement of the Law, and it has been also confirmed in
several cases by the United States Supreme Court. Justice
Holmes accepted it in the case of Strassheim v. Daily in 1911,
and more recently Judge Hand expressed his unqualified ap-
proval of it in the Alcoa case."
The objective theory of jurisdiction applies primarily to
acts committed by foreigners. It is generally accepted that a
state can always exercise its jurisdiction over its own citizens
12. Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect
to Crime 29 AA1. J. INT'L. L. (1935); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS,
§§ 65, 428 (1934).
13. HACKWORTH, 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, f 136 (1941).
14. HYDE, op. cit. supra, [ 238.
15. MOORE, op. cit. supra, ff 201.
16. Strassheim v. Daily, 222 U. S. 280 (1911); United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America, 148 F. 2d. 416 (1945).
[Vol. 13
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abroad on the basis of personal supremacy1T This prin-
ciple has been accepted by most judicial authorities.' 8 It has
also been confirmed on numerous occasions by American
courts.' 9 In a recent case, the Supreme Court stated that
"the United States is not debarred by any rule of interna-
tional law from governing the conduct of its own citizens...
in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or
their nationals are not infringed. ' 20 It is obvious, therefore,
that in exercising its personal supremacy,
a state must not perform acts of sovereignty in the
territory of another state. Thus, for instance, a state is
prevented from requiring such acts from its citizens
abroad as are forbidden to them by the Municipal Law of
the land in which they reside, and from ordering them
not to commit such acts as they are bound to commit ac-
cording the Municipal Law of the land in which they
reside.
2 '
It may be concluded, therefore, that the jurisdiction of
American courts over acts committed by American citizens
abroad may be based on three principles; on the principle of
objective theory, on the principle of nationality, that is on
the principle of personal supremacy, and also, in most cases,
as some of the acts will probably be committed within the
territory, on the principle of territoriality.
It is obvious, however, that the United States will not exer-
cise its jurisdiction over its citizens abroad in an indiscrimi-
nate fashion; this jurisdiction will be asserted only when citi-
zens commit acts which affect the United States or other
United States citizens abroad. 22 This means in effect that, al-
though according to the accepted rules of international law the
United States could exercise jurisdiction over its citizens
abroad on the basis of nationality, for all practical purposes
the actual assertion of this jurisdiction will take place only on
the basis of the objective theory.
In addition to the territorial theory and the objective
theory, there are also certain valid non-territorial theories
17. OPPENHEImii, p. cit. supra, 145.
18. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, op. cit. supra, ir 47 (2). HYDE,
op. cit. supra, 1 240.
19. Blac mer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 (1932); Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co., 344 U. S. 280 (1952).
20. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69 at 73 (1945).
21. OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra, ff 262.
22. Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 100 (1923). Blaclaner v.
United States, 284 U. S. 421 (1932).
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of jurisdiction. It is generally agreed that jurisdiction may
be extended by a state to cover certain specific offenses com-
mitted outside the territory of the state by its citizens or
by foreigners. These offenses usually include acts of piracy,
slave trade, counterfeiting of currency, and acts against the
safety of the state.23 It is also agreed by most states that this
type of jurisdiction cannot extend to acts committed abroad
by foreigners against the citizens of the state, if the effects of
those acts are taking place entirely abroad.
24
The principle of nonterritorial jurisdiction has been ac-
cepted on few occasions by the Supreme Court when the
nature of the offenses warranted its adoption. The Court
stated that there are certain offenses of such a character
that
to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdic-
tion would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness
of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds
.. .25
The above principle applied, however, only to offenses
committed by United States citizens. In such cases, the Court
obviously had jurisdiction over the defendants based on the
principle of nationality. As far as foreigners are concerned,
the nonterritorial principle of jurisdiction has been applied
only to offenses directed against the safety of the state.26
B.
Before the court can establish a legislative jurisdiction over
the acts complained of, it must first establish a jurisdiction
in personam over the defendants. When the defendant is
an American corporation, obviously the American courts will
have jurisdiction, even if the acts complained of took place
abroad. It may happen that courts will have an unquestion-
able in personam jurisdiction, while the establishment of the
legislative jurisdiction will pose various complications, as
has actually occurred in numerous cases in the past. The
question of in personam jurisdiction may, however, present
serious issues when the defendant is a foreign corporation.
There may be three distinct cases involving foreign defend-
ants; it may be an independent foreign corporation trans-
acting business in the United States via its agents or officers;
23. AW0an, op. cit. supra, f 202; HYDE, op. cit. supra, f 241.
24. MoonE, op. cit. supra, 201 (Cutting's case).
25. United States v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94 at 98 (1922).
26. HACKWoRTH, op. cit. supra, 137.
[Vol. 13
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it may be a foreign subsidiary of an American parent com-
pany; and, finally, it may be an American subsidiary of a
foreign parent. An example of the first possibility is the
Alcoa case; examples of the second case are the proceedings
against General Electric and Timken, and the third situa-
tion is illustrated by the situation in the ICI case.27
The jurisdiction in personam over an independent foreign
corporation must be decided on the basis of whether or not
the corporation can be "found" here, or whether or not it
can be proved that it "transacts business" here. A discus-
sion of those two terms has taken place on numerous occa-
sions, and in spite of several dicta on those concepts, the issue
still remains rather ambiguous. This ambiguity can be best
illustrated by quoting a recent dictum of the court. "Whether
due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality
and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the law."2 8 In the famous Kodak case,
the court stated "that a corporation is 'transacting business'
in a district ... if in fact, in the ordinary and usual sense,
it transacts business therein of any substantial character.12 9
Elaborating further on this issue, the court stated that for
purposes of venue it is only necessary that the defendant
"transact business." For the purposes of serving process, how-
ever, it is necessary that the defendant be "found" in the dis-
trict. As being "found" is, of course, a stronger test of pres-
ence than "transacting business," it could happen that the
service of process might not be valid, although venue is
clearly established. In the recent case of Scophony, the court
eliminated the distinction between being "found" and "trans-
acting business," and declared that the test of "transacting
business" applies to the service of process as well as for the
purpose of venue.3 0 Such a decision means, in effect, a liberal-
ization of the tests previously applied by courts, and at the
same time gives a new interpretation of Section 7 of the
Sherman Act and of Section 12 of the Clayton Act.31 Never-
theless, no one really knows exactly how much business in
27. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (1945).
United States v. General Elec. Co., et al., 82 F. Supp. 753 (1949). United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (1951). Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 593 (1951).
28. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 at 319 (1945).
29. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials, 273 U. S. 359
(1927).
30. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U. S. 795 (1948).
31. U. S. C. § 8 (1952).
7
Simmons: Overseas Trade and the Sherman Act
Published by Scholar Commons, 1960
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
the economic sense a company must transact in order to be
found to be "transacting business" in the legal sense. The
1948 De Beers case illustrates this point .
2
In cases involving a foreign parent of an American sub-
sidiary, it has been established on numerous occasions that
service upon the American subsidiary brings its foreign par-
ent within the jurisdiction of the court. In the famous ICI
case, the ICI London was brought under the jurisdiction of
an American court via its subsidiary ICI in New York.83 A
similar procedure was recently applied in the case of Swiss
Watch Manufacturers.34 In both cases the court was satisfied
that the American subsidiary was acting as an alter ego of its
foreign parent.
The General Electric case proved again that American
courts cannot establish in personam jurisdiction over for-
eign subsidiaries of an American parent who is a defendant in
court.
33
It may be also mentioned that in personam jurisdiction
over a wholly foreign defendant may be obtained by confis-
cating his property within the United States. Section 6 of the
Sherman Act provides that "any property owned under any
contract.., or pursuant to any conspiracy mentioned in sec-
tion one of this act... and being in the course of transporta-
tion ... shall be forfeited to the United States." This section
was subsequently amended by the Wilson Act, so as to include
imported goods already within the United States.38 As Sec-
tion 6 has been used only on two occasions in the past, it ap-
pears that its significance is rather negligible.
3 7
C.
As the nature of the Sherman Act is partly penal and
partly remedial, courts in deciding an antitrust case usually
issue injunctions which will remedy the situation and pre-
vent the continuation of illegal practices in the future. In
antitrust cases involving foreign trade, the injunctions issued
by the courts frequently refer to certain activities of defend-
32. United States v. De Beers Consol. Mines, Civil No. 29-446
(S. D. N. Y. 1948).
33. United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504
(1951).
34. United States v. Watchmakers of Swit., 133 F. Supp. 40 (1955).
35. United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (1949).
36. 15 U. S. C. § 8 (1952).
37. United States v. 383, 340 Ounces of Quinine Derivatives, Civil No.
98-942 (S. D. N. Y. 1928). United States v. 5,898 Cases of Sardines,
Civil No. 105-37 (S. D. N. Y. 1930).
[Vol. 13
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ants that are taking place abroad. The question then arises
as to what extent American courts could order the defendant
to perform or not to perform certain acts abroad.
According to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, it is
generally accepted that a court may enjoin the defendants
from doing certain acts outside the territorial limits of its
jurisdiction, and it may also order them to perform certain
acts, provided, however, that the performance of those acts
will not violate the law of the country where the acts are to
be performed.38 On several occasions in the past, courts is-
sued injunctions providing for divestiture abroad, transfer of
patents, and limiting the exercise of patent rights. The in-
junctions issued by American courts were always based on
the assumption that foreign courts would not be involved in
enforcing them and, also, that foreign courts would permit the
defendants to comply with them. So far, the ICI case involv-
ing nylon patents, is the only case where foreign courts have
interfered with compliance with the injunction of an Ameri-
can court. No injunction has ever been issued that would re-
quire its enforcement by a foreign court. Such an injunction
would be contrary to the rules of international law and of
comity.3 9
In issuing injunctions in cases involving foreign trade,
courts will frame their orders with considerations of comity
and of public interest. In a recent case, the court stated that
the relief should consider "the needs of particular case ...
always with due regard to the underlying public interest that
is inherent in antitrust laws." 40 Most of the decrees issued by
courts are expressed in terms of negative prohibitions rather
than in positive orders to perform certain acts. The injunc-
tions can be issued, obviously, only to the defendants in court
and not to the co-conspirators who are not present in court.
This fact limits, of course, the effectiveness of relief, and
may also involve the defendants in litigations abroad. 41 For-
eign partners who are not present in the court may sue the
defendant in foreign courts for damages resulting from the
non-performance of acts which are prohibited by the injunc-
38. REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra, §§ 63, 94, 96 and 97.
Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity over Persons to Compel
Doing of Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of the State, 14 MINN. L.
RTv., 494-529 (1929-1930).
39. OPPENHEim, op. cit. supra, 295.
40. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U. S. 319 at 360 (1947).
41. Ibid.
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tion directed to the defendant. The Report of the Attorney
General's Committee envisage such a possibility, and sug-
gests that the Department of State assist American com-
panies defending such foreign sUits. 4 2
In several cases where foreign defendants or foreign sub-
sidiaries of American defendants were involved, it was neces-
sary for the court to collect documentary evidence which was
located abroad. On many occasions this fact created rather
serious conflicts. Courts acting on a basis of a generally
agreed principle that they may order the defendant to pro-
duce any necessary documents, ordered the defendants to
produce documents which were outside of the United States.4 3
Even when the documents were in the actual possession of
foreign subsidiaries of American defendants, courts believed
that since the defendants exercised control over their subsi-
diaries, they should produce the documents required.44 On
two occasions foreign governments reacted very strongly to
such an order issued by an American court, and prohibited
the removal of any documents from their territories. They
believed that American courts had exceeded their legitimate
powers and had attempted to infringe upon their sover-
eignties. To avoid a repetition of similar situations in the
future, the Dutch Government and the Ontario Government
passed special acts prohibiting the removal of any documents
pursuant to an order of a foreign court.45
The jurisdiction of American courts does not extend, of
course, to foreign governments. It is universally accepted
in international law that governments are exempt from the
jurisdiction of a foreign court.40 This immunity is limited,
however, only to political activities of a foreign government,
and does not cover its commercial activities.47 As early as
1824, Justice Marshall said that "when a government be-
comes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so
42. 1955 ATTY. GEN. NAT'L Coimm. ANTITRUST REP. 76.
43. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra, § 94. SEC v. Mines de
Artemisa, 150 F.2d 215 (1945).
44. In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C.
1952).
45. Ontario passed the Business Records Protection Act (1950) in re-
sponse to In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Addressed to Cana-
dian International Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y., 1947). See
also the recent Dutch Anticartel law passed in response to the American
investigation of the oil cartel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1952, p. 57; April
23, 1953, p. 5.
46. HAcICWORTH, op. cit. supra, 169. MOORE, op. cit. supra, 250.
47. HAcKwoRTH, op. cit. supra, 174.
[Vol. 13
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far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sover-
eign character, and takes that of a private citizen.148 In
spite of this clear statement, however, the issue as to what
constitutes a political or a commercial activity of a foreign
government remains rather unsettled. In two different anti-
trust cases where activities of a foreign government were
involved, courts arrived at different conclusions in spite of
the fact that the circumstances of both cases were almost
identical. In 1929, the Kaiisyndicat case, the court declared
that the defendant corporation, although partially owned
and controlled by the French government, was not identical
with the French government and could not claim immunity
on the basis of being a "foreign sovereign.149 In 1956, in a
case where the circumstances were very similar to those of
Kalisyndicat, the court extended the privilege of sovereign
immunity to the Anglo-Iranian Corporation.50 On the basis
of this limited authority it may be concluded, therefore, that
the question of sovereign immunity in commercial activi-
ties will, in all probability, be decided more on grounds of
political considerations than on the basis of clearcut prin-
ciples.
In exercising jurisdiction over foreign trade of the United
States, American courts frequently had to face a possible
conflict with foreign laws. Many activities of defendants
which were illegal under the Sherman Act were perfectly
legal under the law of the place where they were committed;
foreign law acquiesced in such acts or did not prohibit them.
The fact, however, that certain conduct was legal under the
local law, has never prevented American courts from deciding
that they were illegal under the Sherman Act, whenever
that conduct had substantial detrimental effects upon Amer-
ican foreign trade. It appears, therefore, that only conduct
positively required by foreign law can be exempt from the
Sherman Act. So far, however, no antitrust case has been
presented which would involve activities abroad which were
required by foreign law. It may be presumed, further, that
in order to honor the rules of international comity, the De-
48. Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat (22
U. S.) 904 at 907 (1824).
49. United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndicat Gesellsehaft, 31 F. 2d 199
(1929).
50. In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C.
1952).
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partment of Justice will not present such a case in the fu-
ture.
D.
Although the objective theory of jurisdiction appears to
be generally accepted by leading legal experts when applied
to acts which are recognized as crimes by all civilized na-
tions and to acts which endanger the security of a state,
there has been a large area of disagreement as to whether
this theory should also be applied to the antitrust law. The
critics of the objective theory, who maintain that the courts
should return to the territorial principle when the Sherman
Act is involved, stress the fact that although this theory
might have perfect validity when applied to general criminaZ
law, it has no application to the antitrust law. They main-
tain that in cases of common crimes, the dispute between
sovereign states will evolve only around the question as to
who shall punish the offender; the act itself will, in all
probability, be recognized as a crime by all civilized states.
The position is, however, quite different when it comes to
the antitrust law where certain acts are considered as crimes
only by certain states. These critics quite rightly point out
that the United States is the only country which explicitly
and definitely makes the act of monopolizing a crime. No
other country declares that restraints of trade are a violation
of the law. The question then arises, are the United States
courts justified in extending their jurisdiction to commercial
activities which are perfectly legal in the places where they
are performed?
Furthermore, it is maintained that each country may con-
duct its commercial activities according to different economic
theories, and that the economic interests of the countries
involved may also be different. It is also claimed that it is
very difficult to ascertain the direct economic effects of cer-
tain acts. Those effects are usually very broad and com-
plex, and unless a specific intent to produce them can be
proved, they should not constitute a basis for the objective
theory of jurisdiction. Finally, it is believed that any at-
tempt to regulate commercial activities outside the territory
of the United States may encroach upon the instincts of na-
tional sovereignty of other countries.
The advocates of the application of the objective theory
to the Sherman Act claim that the maintenance of competi-
[Vol. 13
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tion is an important issue of national policy and belongs in
the same category as the National Prohibition Act or the
rules of exchange controls. They point out that almost all
countries that operate foreign exchange controls exercise ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction whenever a violation of those con-
trols takes place. It is also believed that, as past experience
indicates, there is not much danger of a clash with foreign
laws. Finally, the advocates of the objective principle be-
lieve that foreigners who are attracted to operate in the
American market should not object when American courts
assert jurisdiction over their activities outside of the United
States which affect the American market.
Answering the criticism that the application of the anti-
trust law is always uncertain and ambiguous, the propon-
ents of a strong enforcement of the Sherman Act frequently
quote a rather cynical, but nonetheless correct, remark made
by Justice L. D. Brandeis. Testifying before the FTC, he
stated that when businessmen asked him for his advice on
the application of the antitrust laws, he had answered them
that, while he could not tell them how to walk along the edge
of the cliff without falling off, he could always show them a
safe path a little way back.51
In general, it may be said that private lawyers who rep-
resent their clients in antitrust actions almost unanimously
advocate a return to the territorial principle. On the other
hand, lawyers who are, or have been, employed by the various
governmental agencies, such as the Department of Justice,
Department of Commerce, or Department of State, definitely
oppose return to the Banana philosophy, and vigorously ad-
vocate adherence to the objective principle.
William D. Whitney, a noted lawyer and an expert on anti-
trust law, has been probably one of the most vociferous
critics of the presently accepted theory of jurisdiction and
one of the stoutest advocates of the territorial principle. His
attack on the objective concept of jurisdiction is centered on
two points. In the first place, he firmly believes that the way
the Sherman Act is presently applied to foreign trade violates
international law, is contrary to the comity of nations, and
amounts to molestation of foreign countries and interfer-
ence with their domestic affairs. He believes that the courts
are "guilty of judicial aggression" and on several occasions
51, 1915 FTC RECoRDs 12.
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have applied the "law oppressively."5 2 It is his impression
that the United States government has been trying to con-
vert the rest of the world to the American point of view on
economic policies, and that the government has been using the
courts as media of propaganda. He concludes one of his ar-
ticles by saying that "the Department of Justice ... is pros-
tituting our courts to use them as instruments of foreign
policy."s
3
Secondly, he is fully convinced that the present antitrust
policy inflicts irreparable damage upon the United States
businesses abroad and upon the American economy in gen-
eral. He has repeatedly asserted that many American busi-
ness ventures abroad have been disrupted or not undertaken
at all for fear of antitrust prosecution. 54 Similar statements
have been made by Carl W. Hayden, President of the Ameri-
can Chambers of Commerce in London.55 Both Whitney and
Hayden insistently maintain that the present policy of en-
forcing the Sherman Act in the foreign trade area discour-
ages American economic operations abroad and has a sub-
stantial negative effect upon American investment abroad.
However, they do not cite specific examples. When, on the
other hand, the Department of Commerce undertook a spe-
cial survey which might have confirmed the statements of
Whitney and Hayden, it found no United States company
stating that its foreign investment program was inhibited by
the antitrust law." A small percentage of these companies
merely stated that they were somewhat reluctant to make
exclusive patent license agreements with foreigners.
When Whitney testified before a Senate committee, he
unequivocally stated that, in his opinion, any act committed
abroad, no matter how directly and substantially it might
affect United States trade, should be outside the jurisdiction
of American courts. He believed that
no principle of the international law is more universally
recognized than that each nation is sovereign in its own
52. WHITNEY, Antitrust Law and Foreign Commerce, 11 REcoRD oF
THE AssoCIATioN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YOR 135-36 (1956).
53. Id., p. 139.
54. WHITNEY, Sources of Conflict Between International Law and the
Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L. J., 655-62 (1954); W. D. WHITNEY, Planning
Foreign Trade, How TO COMPLY WITH ANTITRUST LAWS, (Chicago; Com-
merce Clearing House, 1954), p. 370-78.
55. STAFF OF SUB-COMM. ON ANTITRUST LAWS, SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDIcIARY, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE, Part 4, p.
1852 (Comm. Print 1955).
56. Id., p. 1807.
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territory and, accordingly, the rule is basic that the laws
of a nation apply only to the acts and events within its
own territory. 7
Needless to say, the committee was not too greatly im-
pressed with Whitney's approach.
Another 'noted antitrust lawyer, George W. Haight, may
be considered as a representative of a more moderate school
of thought on this subject. He recognizes the principle of
objective jurisdiction but feels it should not be applied to
antitrust law because this law is too vague and too complex,
and the acts of monopolization are considered as crimes only
in the United States and nowhere else.5"
Another example of this moderate opposition to the prin-
ciple of objective jurisdiction may be found in the writings
of J. E. Lockwood and W. C. Schmeisser.59 They also recog-
nize the general validity of the objective theory of jurisdic-
tion but oppose its application in the antitrust area. They be-
lieve that its application there would lead to chaos and would
violate the principles of commercial cooperation between
nations and mutual respect for each other's laws. To avoid
this, they propose that each nation adopt a strictly territorial
concept of law so far as commercial activities are concerned.
The advocates of the strictly territorial application of the
Sherman Act have one thing in common - they all overlook
one very significant fact which is probably the crucial issue
here. They give the impression that the Department of Jus-
tice and the court have attempted to regulate all commercial
activities of American companies abroad and that the courts
have tried to extend their jurisdiction to commercial activi-
ties of foreigners in their own countries. Obviously, nothing
could be further from the truth. Again and again the courts
have explicitly stated that they have tried to control only
those activities abroad which intend to, and actually do, have
detrimental effects upon United States foreign trade. What
the advocates of the territorial principle actually want is for
the United States to give up the control over acts which, al-
though performed abroad, affect the domestic economy of the
United States. Such a surrender of control would be not only
against the spirit of the Sherman Act but also contrary to the
57. Id., p. 1751.
58. HAIGHT, International Law and Extraterrito7ial Application of tho
Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L. J., 643 (1954).
59. LOCKWOOD AND SCHMEISSER, Restrictive Business Practices in Inter-
national Trade, 11 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 680-83 (1946).
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provisions of the Constitution which give control over foreign
trade to the Federal authorities.
Discussing the question of jurisdiction and the critics' ar-
guments that the acts committed outside United States bor-
ders, even if they directly affect United States commerce,
should in no case come under United States jurisdiction, As-
sistant Attorney General V. R. Hansen points out that "if
the same theory were applied to all nations, it seems clear
that such activities would be then outside the jurisdiction
of any nation.160
The critics of the objective theory of jurisdiction may be
found not only among American lawyers and businessmen;
Sir Hartley Shawcross, when addressing the convention of
the American Bar Association, criticized this theory too.
In the course of his discussion of the American idea that a
state may exercise jurisdiction over acts of foreigners which
take place abroad and which result in illegal effects at home,
he stated that
our courts do not accept that at all. We regard it as an
excess of jurisdiction contrary to international law. We
do not recognize any right on the part of a foreign court
to pass upon contracts lawfully made here by British con-
cerns or by British with foreign concerns even though
that contract may have some effects in the foreign coun-
try.0 1
He concluded his discussion by stating that "we should view
with much anxiety any attempt to assert criminal jurisdic-,




Recently, a special committee of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York presented a study of the relation-
ship between the enforcement of the Sherman Act and foreign
economic policies. 8 A major part of this study was devoted
to the question of the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act over
60. HANSEN, The Enforcement of the United States Antitrust Laws
bVI the Department of Justice to Protect Freedom of United States For-
eign Trade, 11 ABA ANTITRUST SEC. PRoc., 75 at 80 (1957).
61. SHAWCROSS, English Restrictive Practice Legislation; Extraterri-
torial Effects of U. S. Antitrust Laws, 11 ABA ANTITRUST SEC. PROC., 111
at 114 (1957).
62. Id. at 115.
63. National Security and Foreign Policy in the Application of Ameri.
can Antitrust Laws to Commerce with Foreign Nations, NYBA COMM.
ON ANTITRUST AND FOREIGN TRADE (1957).
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foreign trade. The committee analyzed the important de-
cisions of the courts, presented its evaluations of these de-
cisions, and finally came out with its own conclusions.
The report violently attacks the recent policy of the De-
partment of Justice, criticizing especially the objective theory
of jurisdiction. It states that the enforcement of antitrust
laws was characterized by "disregard by us of traditions and
and principles of public international law."04 The committee
believes that the application of the antitrust laws "not only
may result in a violation of principles of international law,
but also may cause disrespect for the law." 65 The way the
committee presents its case against the objective principle
leaves the reader with the impression that the United States
courts try to control any and all acts committed abroad
which have even the slightest unintentional and incidental
effect upon United States economy. There is no evidence for
such a conclusion. On the contrary, the courts have always
stated that the Sherman Act applies only when effects upon
the American economy are intended and where they are sub-
stantial. The committee further errs in attacking the sup-
posed application of the Sherman Act to activities which
are positively required by a foreign government. There is
no case in the entire history of the Sherman Act in which
this statute has been applied to an act required by a foreign
government. Finally, the committee states that "the obliga-
tion to conform to the antitrust laws abroad is not a duty in-
herent in citizenship. ' 66 There is no evidence in the judicial
history of the United States which would support a claim
that courts have no jurisdiction over United States citizens
abroad, when their acts violate United States laws. In the
recent case of Bulova Watch, the court explicitly states that
"Congress in prescribing standards of conduct for American
citizens may project the impact of its laws beyond the terri-
torial boundaries of the United States." 67
The way the committee attacks the objective theory of
jurisdiction creates the impression that the courts have at-
tempted to exercise authority over acts which have nothing
to do with United States economy and are totally unrelated
to American markets. In its report the committee has failed
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id. at 9.
66. Id. at 11.
67. Steele et al. v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U. S. 280 at 282 (1952).
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to see that the issue of effects radiating from certain acts
committed abroad is the crux of the problem.
F.
A new approach to the question of jurisdiction of the anti-
trust law has been presented recently by Professor Kingman
Brewster of the Harvard School of Law. He proposes the
introduction of a concept which he calls a jurisdictional rule
of reason. 68 This rule of reason would have, of course, noth-
ing to do with the rule of reason as introduced by the courts
in 1911. 9 His jurisdictional rule of reason would apply
only to questions of jurisdiction of the Sherman Act over is-
sues arising from foreign trade. Professor Brewster believes
that this area of antitrust presents a number of very deli-
cate and complicated problems. In order to avoid a possi-
bility of jurisdictional conflicts and clashes, he proposes that
the following aspects of the case be analyzed before jurisdic-
tion is claimed:
1. Relative significance of the alleged conduct.
2. Extent to which the conduct complained of was ex-
plicitly designed to affect the United States.
3. Relative seriousness of the effects on United States
economy.
4. Degree of conflict with foreign laws.
5. Extent to which conflict can be avoided without se-
rious impairment of American interest or the inter-
est of the foreign countries.
The above factors would operate within relatively broad lim-
its. The limits themselves are defined by Professor Brews-
ter, as, on the one hand, "the absence of demonstrable harm
to the United States," and on the other hand, "the presence
of demonstrable foreign objections." Within these two ex-
tremes the jurisdictional rule of reason would function.
A proposal very close to Professor Brewster's suggestion
has been outlined by Arthur H. Dean. He calls his approach to
the question of jurisdiction "a rule of reasonable balancing. ' 70
He maintains that the rule introduced by Judge L. Hand in
the Alcoa case is not broad enough. He believes that before
68. BREWSTER, Extraterritorial Effects of the United States Antitrust
Laws: An Appraisal, 11 ABA ANTITRUST SEC. PROC., 65 and 72 (1957).
69. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911).
70. H. DEAN, Extraterritorial Effects of the United States Antitrust
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jurisdiction is claimed over a case involving foreign trade,
not only purely judicial factors should be considered but also
due weight should be given to economic, political, and diplo-
matic issues. A process of reasonable balancing of all fac-'
tors involved should be employed, and the antitrust issues
should be placed within the larger framework of the general
economic policy.
This author believes that in almost all cases involving for-
eign trade and the Sherman Act, the jurisdictional issues are
decided by the courts with reference to the above-mentioned
jurisdictional rule of reason, even if this was never explicitly
mentioned. From an analysis of the cases, one may gain the
definite impression that neither the courts nor the Depart-
ment of Justice blindly followed the objective theory of juris-
diction; usually they apply the jurisdictional rule of reason
in determining whether or not the acts of the defendants
are within the court's jurisdiction. The debate which is now
taking place on the subject of jurisdiction is really centered
on the issue of the degree to which the jurisdictional rule of
reason should be applied.
The preceding review demonstrates a gradual development
and transformation of the concept of jurisdiction. The early
concepts of the purely territorial approach have been replaced
by broader and wider concepts of jurisdiction. Experience,
apparently, requires bringing within national control that part
of the economic activities of the nation which spread beyond
its borders. According to some authorities, this process has
been the inevitable consequence of a new concept of the state
itself. Professor K. S. Carlston plainly states that "the au-
thority of the modern state is not and cannot be confined
within its national borders."71 Following this philosophy, the
concept of acts subject to national control has been expanded
to include acts committed abroad which have consequences
taking place within the state, or which are a part of a series
of related events taking place, in some degree, within the
state.
Concluding this part of the discussion, we may say that
although there is a strong presumption of jurisdictional in-
hibition which usually limits the application of law to acts
taking place within the territory of the lawmaker, neverthe-
less, an increase in the area of economic regulation exercised
71. CARLSTON, op. cit. supra, p. 581.
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by governments necessitates the extension of jurisdiction
beyond the boundaries of the state. The territorial limits of
jurisdiction are perfectly applicable to simple crimes. The
concept of strict territoriality fails, however, to provide a
satisfactory and adequate approach when wider issues of
economic policies are involved. Today, many experts would
not deny judicial competence to a court whenever there are
strong reasons for extending the jurisdiction outside the
territory of the nation. Although the principle of territori-
ality should remain as a basic approach to the construction
of law, it is believed, nevertheless, that frequently it must
be replaced by a more realistic approach required by spe-
cific circumstances.
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS
II. The Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. Case
In the analysis of the issues discussed here, the so called
ICI litigation72 occupies a special place. It is the only major
case approaching a conflict between the American and Brit-
ish courts. It has been frequently analyzed and commented
upon by American and British experts, with their opinions
varying all the way from describing it as an imperialistic
aggression of a United States court upon a foreign sover-
eignty, to saying that the case represented a perfect example
of international cooperation and mutual understanding. It
is believed that a close analysis of the facts will dispel many
of the misconceptions which were created by the decision in
the United States and Great Britain. It is interesting also
to observe the behavior of the courts in these two countries
in a situation where highly controversial issues were involved.
As several aspects of the ICI case were discussed in other
sections of this study, only a summary outline will be pre-
sented here. Discussion will be centered on the question of
conflict between the American courts trying to enforce the
Sherman Act and the British courts protecting British citi-
zens from the jurisdiction of an American court.
In 1951 the United States District Court decided that Im-
perial Chemical Industries, Ltd., Imperial Chemical Industries,
72. United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. et al., 100 F. Supp. 504S. D. N. Y. 1951) (opinion on violation) and 105 F. Supj,. 215S. D. N. Y. 1952) (opinion on relief).
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Ltd. (New York), and the du Pont Corporation were guilty
of violating the Sherman Act by restricting American for-
eign trade in chemical products. The restraints were effected
by jointly owned subsidiaries, patent exchanges, and other
cartel arrangements. In 1952 the same District Court pre-
sided over by Judge Ryan issued a supplementary opinion
on remedies. The purpose of this supplementary opinion was
to prevent repetition of previous violations, destroy the ef-
fects of illegal arrangements, and restore competition among
the defendants. The opinion dealt with subsidiaries and with
patents. Although the remedies concerning the future of the
subsidiaries did not provoke any serious complaints, the
problems involved in the reassignments of patents became the
center of the international controversy.
Judge Ryan found that the essence of the violations was a
series of unlawful agreements to divide world markets and to
eliminate competition between ICI and du Pont. Among
many other things the District Court found that "exchange
of patents, processes and know-how served as direct instru-
ments used by the conspirators to achieve the unlawful pur-
poses."?-3 The evidence proved that patent agreements were
used by the defendants to divide territories, to eliminate
exports and imports, to eliminate competition, and thus to
implement the illegal restraints upon United States foreign
trade. ICI was prevented from importing into the United
States; du Pont, on the other hand, was prevented from
exporting from the United States into the territories of ICI
or of their jointly owned subsidiaries. As patents served
as a main pillar of the whole scheme of cooperation be-
tween ICI and du Pont, the court believed that their use
would have to be regulated and controlled by the court. The
court was of the opinion that "compulsory licensing will serve
to . . . promote the flow of foreign trade to and from the
United States, ' 74 and although it realized that it could not
directly force du Pont to export, it believed that by ordering
a compulsory licensing of du Pont's patents, it would enable
other companies licensed by du Pont to export, and by doing
so it would, probably, compel du Pont to export too.
Concerning the patents held by IC, the Department of
Justice and the court made a clear-cut distinction between
73. 105 F. Supp. 215 at 221.
74. Id. at 226.
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British patents and American patents held by that company.
The court ordered that all their American patents be sub-
ject to the same order of compulsory licensing, while at the
same time the government requested that "ICI be required
to grant immunity under its foreign patents which corres-
pond to the United States patents which we have made sub-
ject to compulsory licensing."75 When ICI objected strongly
to this order and maintained that British courts would not
enforce such a provision, the court said that
as to this, we observe that acting on the basis of our
jurisdiction in personam, we are merely directing ICI
to refrain from asserting rights which it may have in
Britain, since the enforcement of those rights will serve
to continue the effects of wrongful acts it has committed
within the United States affecting the foreign trade of
the United States.
7 6
The Judge stated here that patents were employed to re-
strain du Pont's exports to Great Britain in plain violation
of the Sherman Act, while at the same time patents were used
as a means to prevent ICI from exporting into the United
States and thus placed a restraint upon the the foreign trade
of Great Britain in violation of the declared British policy
of stimulating exports to the dollar area.
The court was fully aware that its judgment might create
some conflicts of international law. Recognizing that "sub-
stantial legal questions may be raised with respect to our
power to declare" as to the foreign patents issued to ICI and
du Pont, it plainly and explicitly stated that
the effectiveness of the exercise of that power depends
upon the recognition which will be given to our judg-
ment as a matter of comity by the courts of the foreign
sovereign which has granted the patents in question.
7
Although it was fully aware that a possibility existed that
this recognition might not be forthcoming and thus the ef-
fectiveness of the order partially nullified, the court stated
that "this should not deter us from making directions we feel
are required, even though the application of them may be
limited in operation by the possible action of an official of a
foreign sovereign."78
75. Id. at 228.
76. Ibid.
77. Id. at 229.
78. Id. at 230.
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Finally, the court approached the controversial issue of the
nylon patents and of British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. The de-
velopment of nylon was wholly a du Pont project. In 1939
du Pont granted an exclusive license for the production of
nylon in Great Britain to ICI. In 1946 du Pont assigned its
British patents for nylon to ICI which in turn granted an
irrevocable and exclusive license to British Nylon Spinners
Ltd., a subsidiary in which ICI had 50 per cent stock interest.
In order to remove any restrictions imposed by II on im-
ports of nylon into Great Britain from the United States, the
court ordered the reassignment of nylon patents back from
ICI to du Pont. The problem would have been relatively
simple had not ICI assigned those nylon patents to BNS, so
that ICI no longer exercised any legal control over those
patents. The Court realized full well that BNS was not a
party before the court. It believed, however, that BNS was
fully aware of all the details about the illegal arrangement
between ICI and du Pont and, therefore, was not an innocent
party. This belief appeared to be the focal point of the whole
issue involving BNS. It sounds rather strange, however,
that a United States court formulated its opinion about the
guilt or innocence of a British corporation which was not
named as a defendant or even as a co-conspirator.
After decreeing this reassignment of patents from II to
du Pont the court for the second time stated that
what credit may be given to such an injunctive pro-
vision by the courts of Great Britain in a suit brought
by BNS to restrain such importation we do not venture
to predict. We feel that the possibility that the English
courts in an equity suit will not give effect to such a pro-
vision in our decree should not deter us from including
it.7s
Immediately after the District Court issued the decree,
BNS sued in London for an injunction to restrain any act
by ICI which would impair its contractual rights.80 This
injunction was granted by the High Court of Justice and an
appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. Two years
later the case came for trial, and the trial court, in essence,
affirmed the opinion of 1952.81
'79. Id. at 231.
80. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. [1953]
1 Ch. 19 (C. A.).
81. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. [1955]
1 Ch. 37.
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The substance of the opinion of the court was that the
rules of comity did not require British courts to give effect
to a United States judgment against a British national which
affected other British nationals and two different property
rights created under the British law. 2 One property right in-
volved ICI's legal title to the British patents for nylon and
the second dealt with BNS's contractual right to perform-
ance of a contract executed in Great Britain according to
British law between itself and IC. The court thus refused to
deprive BNS, a British corporation over which the United
States courts had no jurisdiction, of the benefits of a legal
contract, and issued a decree restraining I0I from parting
with any patents to which it had given an exclusive license
to BNS. The court based its decree partly on the fact that
BNS was not a party to, nor had any knowledge of, any il-
legal conspiracy contrary to United States law.
The history of the ICI case in the American and British
courts undoubtedly presents at first sight par excellence ex-
ample of a conflict of international law. This apparent con-
flict had its origin in the attempts of an American court to
extend, its jurisdiction beyond the territorial boundaries of
the United States.. Here we have a case of a foreign com-
pany - ICI - being caught between the blades of a scissors.
On the one hand the United States court ordered it to break
its contract with BNS; on the other hand the British court
enjoined it from breaking this contract.
For those American lawyers who dislike and reject an ef-
fective enforcement of the Sherman Act at home and abroad,
the ICI case became an excellent excuse to advocate a relax-
ation of the application of the Sherman Act to American for-
eign trade. They saw there a great international conflict
and they painted a vivid picture of a great international
clash. The representatives of this group were William Dwight
Whitney and George W. Haight, both noted corporate law-
yers and experts in antitrust law. In a voluminous body of
literature they described the policy of the Department of Jus-
tice and the opinion of Judge Ryan as a "judicial aggression,"
a "violation of the international law," and an "imposition of
82. For a discussion of the opinion of the British Court see: TIMBERG,
Antitrust and Foreign Trade, 48 Nw. U. L. REv., 412 (1953); TIMBERG,
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our laws on foreign countries."8' 3 Carried away by his own
enthusiasm, Whitney stated that by this decision the United
States courts were giving "support to totalitarian doc-
trines."8 4 He further maintained that Judge Ryan tried tc
assert the general supremacy and leadership of the United
States and by doing so infringed upon the sovereignty of
other countries s5 Haight concurred in most of Whitney's
statements.86 Similar exaggerated opinions were voiced by
Carl W. Hayden, President of the American Chamber of
Commerce in London.87 The official report of the American
Bar Association, in its discussion of the ICI case, did not
spare its criticism of Judge Ryan, accusing him of making
"futile gestures based on wholly unrealistic assumptions." 88
A careful reading and'thorough analysis of Judge Ryan's
dicta will show clearly that he was far from committing a
judicial aggression and a violation of comity of nations. Sev-
eral statements of his, quoted on preceding pages, show quite
obviously that he was wholly mindful of the possible inter-
tional complications and that he knew very well that a Brit-
ish court would have the final word in this case. An exam-
ination of the Court's opinion plainly reveals that Judge Ryan
was cautiously stepping on very slippery ground, fully aware
that his words would have worldwide repercussions. He
seemed aware of the possible lack of cooperation from the
British, but he felt that duty compelled him to use the best
possible remedial action, and he hoped that this action would
be approved by the British courts. As an American judge
sitting in an American court, however, he had no choice but
to apply the American law in the best possible way. He cer-
tainly was interested not in destroying the licenses possessed
by the BNS, but in assuring that du Pont should not by this
device exclude its American products from the British mar-
ket. The tone of his opinion indicated plainly that he was
trying to avoid, almost at any price, any possible conflict of
83. WHITNEY, Antitrust Law and Foreign Commerce, II REcoRD OF
THE AssoCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY or NEW YoRK, 135 (1956).
84. Id. at 137.
85. WHITNEY, Sources of Conflict Between International Law and the
Antitrust Laws, LXIH YALE L. T., 661 (1954).
86. HAIGHT, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the
Antitrust Laws, LXIII YALE L. J., 639 (1954).
87. STAFF OF SUB COMm. ON ANTITRUST LAW, COmm. ON JUDICIARY,
84th Cong., Ist Sess., REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE, Part 4, p. 1852 (1955).
88. Impact of Antitrust Laws on Foreign Trade, ABA COMM. ON
INT'L TRADE REG. 12 (1953).
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international law. His dicta were most conciliatory and his
opinion was based on an objective examination of the facts
of the case.
In the first place, the evidence produced in court proved
that patents were one of the major tools used in effecting an
illegal conspiracy. To prevent the re-establishment of this
conspiracy in the future, some judicial action on patents was
essential. In the second place, ICI and BNS were aware that
the nylon patent was originally the property of du Pont and
was issued in the United States. Finally, it has to be men-
tioned that no great injustice was done to ICI. The decree
authorized ICI to collect reasonable royalties on all nylon
products imported in Great Britain. The real loser was du
Pont, which was not allowed to collect any royalties on items
destined for exports. Furthermore, it is important to remem-
ber that BNS was not a completely independent entity, but
was a subsidiary owned partly by IC1. The contract of 1946
assigning the patents from ICI to BNS was, therefore, more
in the nature of an internal deal within a large corporate
enterprise. It was not a contract with a complete outsider
who was totally independent and innocent of anything that
ICI did. From the practical point of view there is no doubt
that the policies of BNS were dictated by ICI. As the assign-
ment of the nylon patents by ICI to BNS took place after the
Department of Justice started the investigation of the al-
leged conspiracy between ICI and du Pont, there may be some
ground for suspecting that ICI assigned the nylon patents
to BNS in order to remove these patents from the jurisdic-
tion of an American Court.
Looking at the whole problem from the British point of
view, the courts in London stood on very firm ground. BNS
was an independent party outside the jurisdiction of the
United States, the contract between ICI and BNS was ob-
viously valid and legal, and there was, therefore, no reason
to permit ICI to withdraw a perfectly legal patent assign-
ment. The important thing, however, was that the British
court did not see any violation of international law in the
decree of the American court, nor did it see any serious con-
flict of law. It explicitly stated that the United States court
had jurisdiction over ICI, and that it could, therefore, direct
ICI to do, or refrain from doing, certain acts outside the
United States if those acts affected United States foreign
[Vol. is
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trade.8 9 Lord Denning stated unequivocally that there was no
conflict between the orders of the American and the British
courts, since the United States judgment had "a provision
which says that nothing in the judgment shall operate against
the company for action taken in complying with the law of
any foreign government or instrumentality thereof to which
the defendant company is for the time being subject."9 0
Upon closer scrutiny of the ICI case, instead of being an
example of international conflict, as the critics of Judge Ryan
maintained, appears to present an example of international
understanding, cooperation, mutual respect for sovereignty
of national law, and a conciliatory attitude displayed by both
sides in a strikingly difficult case. Being the only major in-
stance of a situation of this sort, this case illustrates con-
clusively that the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act, as used by Judge Ryan, did not necessarily lead to a
conflict of law and violation of other nations' sovereignty.
Victor R. Hansen, the Chief of the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice, when commenting on this case, as-
serted that it "indicates a substantial agreement by American
and British courts on this question of jurisdiction."' A simi-
lar conclusion was reached by T. V. Kalijarvi, the Deputy
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, when testi-
fying before a Senate Committee investigating the effective-
ness of antitrust legislation.2 It appears, then, that the
judges on both sides of the Atlantic instead of being criti-
cized should be congratulated for their restraint and their
display of complete respect.
The criticism of Judge Ryan came not only from the Amer-
ican lawyers and businessmen; British legal circles also did
not kindly receive the decision of Judge Ryan. Several Brit-
ish authors expressed their doubts about the correctness of
Judge Ryan's attitude. Professor 0. Kahn-Freund believed
that "the proposition that the American law should be able
to compel an English company in England to break its Eng-
lish contract with another English company is plainly ab-
89. [1953] 1 Ch. 19 at 25 (C. A.). See HANSEN, The Enforcement of
the United States Antitrust Laws by the Department of Justicel to Pro-
tect Freedom of United States Foreign Trade, 11 ABA ANTITRUST SEc.
PRoC., 75 at 82 (1957).
90. [1955] 1 Ch. 37 (Ch.); See TrIBERO, Antitrust and Foreign Trade,
supra, at 414.
91. HANSEN, op. cit. supra, p. 84.
92. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTTrRUST LAW, supra, at 1844.
27
Simmons: Overseas Trade and the Sherman Act
Published by Scholar Commons, 1960
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
surd."0 3 In his opinion Judge Ryan attempted to exercise an
extraterritorial jurisdiction which could not be recognized
by other nations. Professor Kahn-Freund was afraid that
the tendency of the United States courts to extend the Sher-
man Act abroad amounted actually to "the claim that this
law should be a world law of practically unrestricted interna-
tional application."04 A careful reading of Judge Ryan's de-
cree will show, as has been mentioned earlier, that he had no
intentions of this sort. He was applying the Sherman Act not
to world trade in general but to certain activities of foreign
companies doing business in the United States, which directly
and substantially affected American foreign trade.
The last word from the British side about the ICI case
was probably spoken by Sir Hartley Shawcross. He viewed
with the greatest apprehension the increasing tendency of
American courts to pass opinions "upon contracts lawfully
made here by British concerns or by British with foreign
concerns even though those contracts may have some effects"
in the United States.9 He believed that great anxiety would
be created in British legal and governmental circles if the
United States courts were to persist in their attempts to exer-
cise jurisdiction upon economic matters which were lawfully
contracted in Great Britain, even if those matters affected
markets in the United States and were contrary to American
law.
The international aspects of the ICI case unquestionably
presented a very serious difficulty and a dilemma for Judge
Ryan and for the British courts. The difficulties present in
the ICI case reflected on a small scale the complexity of the
problems inherent in an effective application of the Sher-
man Act to American foreign trade. On the one hand, in or-
der to secure an effective enforcement of the antitrust law
in the foreign trade area the Sherman Act has to be applied
on many occasions to acts which took place outside the terri-
tory of the United States. On the other hand, however, any
extension of the Sherman Act beyond the territory of the
United States may be met with conflicting foreign legal and
economic attitudes. The ICI case, however, presented an ex-
93. 0. KAHN-FREuND, English Contracts and American Antitrut Law
- The Nylon Patent Case, XVIII MoDER= L. REV., 67 (1955).
94. Id. at 70.
95. SHAWCROSS, English Restrictive Practice Legislation; Extraterri-
torial Effects of U. S. Antitrust Laws, Report, 11 ABA ANTITRUST SEC.
PROC., 111 at 114 (1957).*
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cellent example of how a potential conflict between two differ-
ent economic and legal systems could be solved in an amic-
able and tolerant way. There are indications that should a
similar situation arise in the future it would be accorded a
similar restraint and respect.
The ICI case proved an additional and very interesting
point. There have been many foreign critics of the Sherman
Act who looked upon its application to United States foreign
trade as a visible sign of American aggressiveness and Ameri-
can desire to spread the gospel of competition all over the
world. They maintained that the benefits derived from un-
restricted competition would invariably accrue to the stronger
and more dominant American enterprises, while the weaker
foreign business partners would be squeezed out. The ICE
case proved that it is not always so. It proved that the bene-
fits stemming from competition may also accrue to others.
Within one year after the decision was announced by Judge
Ryan, and after the restraints upon competition between ICI
and du Pont were removed, the export trade of ICI to the
United States increased from half a million dollars to five
and a half million dollars.9 6 In this instance the Sherman Act
proved to be beneficial not only to the American public but
also to the British balance of payments. It extended the ad-
vantages of competition not only to American but also to for-
"eign markets.
96. TIMBERG, Discusion, 11 ABA ANTITRUST SEC. PROC., 105 at 107
(1957).
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